Abstract. In sequential economies with finite or infinite-lived real assets in positive net supply, we introduce constraints on the amount of borrowing in terms of the market value of physical endowments. We show that, when utility functions are either unbounded and separable in states of nature or separable in commodities, these borrowing constraints not only preclude Ponzi schemes but also induce endogenous Radner bounds on short-sales. Therefore, we obtain existence of equilibrium. Moreover, equilibrium also exists when both assets are numerarie and utility functions are quasilinear in the commodity used as numerarie.
Introduction
Ponzi schemes need to be avoided in order to obtain existence of equilibrium in infinite horizon incomplete markets. Indeed, debt constraints or transversality conditions have been required to assure that agents do not postpone, ad infinitum, the payments of their commitments. Within this context, many authors had shown that equilibrium exists when financial markets are composed by short-lived numeraire or nominal assets (see, for instance, Kehoe and Levine (1993) , Magill and Quinzii (1994) , Florenzano and Gourdel (1996) , Hernández and Santos (1996) , Levine and Zame (1996) , and Araujo, Monteiro and Páscoa (1996) ). Also, Hernández and Santos (1996) prove the existence of equilibrium when only one infinite-lived real asset, in positive net supply, is available for trade.
However, when financial markets include non-numerarie finite-lived real assets or more than one infinite-lived real asset, equilibrium existence has been guaranteed at most for dense subsets of economies (see, for instance, Hernández and Santos (1996) and Magill and Quinzii (1996) ). In fact, in this scenario, Ponzi schemes are not the unique possible reason for non-existence of equilibrium.
Precisely, since the rank of returns matrices become dependent on asset prices and conventional debt constraints bound the portfolio markets value but not the amount of borrowing, short-sales may fail to have endogenous upper bounds. Thus, agents can have more access to credit in any asset just by increasing their investment in the other securities. As a consequence, finite horizon economies, that
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are obtained by truncating the infinite horizon economy in order to prove equilibrium existence, may not have equilibrium.
The aim of this paper is to show the existence of equilibrium in a market where real assets in positive net supply can be traded. To prevent Ponzi schemes, the amount of borrowing that each agent is able to get becomes dependent on the market value of (individual or aggregated) physical endowments. We remark that, since assets may be infinite-lived, positive net supply is a necessary requirement for equilibrium existence in our model. Indeed, with zero net supply assets, finite asset prices might be incompatible with non-arbitrage conditions (as we remark after our main result).
This difficulty was also pointed out by Hernández and Santos (1996, Example 3.9) in their model with debt constrained agents.
We prove that equilibrium exists when utility functions are either separable in the states of nature and unbounded or separable in commodities. Since we require utility functions to be unbounded only in those commodities in which real assets make promises, in the particular case in which assets are numerarie, to assure equilibrium existence it suffices to have utility functions which are quasi-linear in the commodity used as numerarie.
To prove our results, we follow the classical approach that finds an equilibrium as a limit of equilibria corresponding to a sequence of finite horizon economies. As a first step, we show a result of equilibrium existence for truncated economies by defining associated generalized games and showing that equilibrium asset prices are uniformly bounded. We remark that a positive lower bound for asset prices leads to short-sales constraints (Radner bounds) induced by borrowing restrictions. Since utility functions are unbounded in commodities in which assets pay, in equilibrium the market value of the positive net supply need to have a bounded purchase power, node by node.
Thus, as positive net supply of assets neither depreciates nor disappear from the economy, there are endogenous upper bounds for asset prices. These upper bounds leads to a natural restriction on the set of prices that is selected in the generalized game. Thus, we can guarantee the non-emptiness of the interior of the budget constraint correspondences. In a second step, we check the asymptotic properties of individual debt, namely, transversality conditions, which are actually obtained as a consequence of the structure of restrictions on borrowing. Indeed, since we show that under KuhnTucker multipliers the discounted value of individual wealth is finite, borrowing constraints prevent agents to be borrowers at infinity.
We remark that economies where physical endowments have no strictly positive lower bound are included within the framework stated in this paper. Furthermore, although utility functions are required to be separable, non-stationary intertemporal discounting is also compatible with our assumptions. In addition, when at each node of the economy there is only one asset to be traded, we can go further and assure that borrowing constraints become non-binding.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we state our main result of equilibrium existence whose proof is relegated to a final Appendix. In Section 4 we include some comments which connect our existence results and the required assumptions with the related literature. Moreover, we also present remarks on non-binding borrowing constraints, uniform impatience and rational asset pricing bubbles. We finish the paper with a concluding remarks section.
Model
We consider a discrete time economy with infinite horizon. Let S be the non-empty set of states of nature. At each date, individuals have common information about the realization of the uncertainty.
Let F t be the information available at date t ∈ {0, 1, . . .} which is given by a finite partition of S.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no loss of information along the event-tree, i.e., F t+1 is finer than F t , for each t ≥ 0. Moreover, no information is available at t = 0, i.e., F 0 = S.
A pair ξ = (t, σ), where t ≥ 0 and σ ∈ F t , is called a node of the economy. The date associated to ξ is denoted by t(ξ). The set of all nodes, called the event-tree, is denoted by D. Given ξ = (t, σ) and µ = (t , σ ), we say that µ is a successor of ξ, and we write µ ≥ ξ, if t ≥ t and σ ⊂ σ. Let ξ + be the set of immediate successors of ξ, that is, the set of nodes µ ≥ ξ, where t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1. The (unique) predecessor of ξ is denoted by ξ − and ξ 0 is the node at t = 0. Let
At each ξ ∈ D there is a finite ordered set, L, of perishable commodities that can be traded in
+ be the vector of commodity prices at ξ. Also, the process of commodity prices is denoted by p = (p(ξ); ξ ∈ D).
There is an ordered set J of real assets that can be negotiated in the economy. Each asset j ∈ J is characterized by the node at which it is issued, ξ j ∈ D, by the maximum number of period in which it can be negotiated, T j ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, and by (unitary) real payments,
construction, we avoid fiat money in our economy.
At each node the number of issued assets is finite. That is, the set J(ξ) = {j ∈ J : (ξ ∈ D Tj −1 (ξ j )) ∧ (∃µ > ξ, A(µ, j) = 0)}, formed by the assets that can be negotiated at ξ, is either empty or finite. If for every T > 0 there exists ξ ∈ D T (ξ j ) such that j ∈ J(ξ), then we say that asset j is infinite-lived.
Let q(ξ) = (q j (ξ); j ∈ J(ξ)) be the vector of asset prices at ξ. Also, q = (q(ξ); ξ ∈ D) denotes the process of asset prices in the economy. Define
A finite number of agents, h ∈ H, trade securities and buy commodities at each node in the event-tree. Each h ∈ H is characterized by her physical and financial endowments, (w
+ , at each ξ ∈ D, and by her preferences on consumption, which are represented by an utility function
For each j ∈ J(ξ), e h j (ξ) = ξj ≤µ≤ξ e h j (µ) denotes the vector of aggregated financial endowments received by agent h up to node ξ, where e h j (µ) is the quantity of asset j received by agent h at µ. Essentially, we assume that assets' net supply does not disappear or depreciate, before its terminal nodes. We denote by
physical endowments up to node ξ ∈ D, where A(ξ 0 , j) = 0, for each j ∈ J(ξ 0 ). Also, we write
be the consumption bundle of agent h at ξ. Analogously, θ h j (ξ) and ϕ h j (ξ) denote, respectively, the quantity of asset j ∈ J(ξ) that agent h buys and sells at ξ. Thus, given commodity and asset prices (p, q), each agent h ∈ H maximizes her preferences by choosing
, which belongs to her budget set B h (p, q), which is given by the collection of allocations (x, θ, ϕ) ∈ E such that, for every ξ ∈ D, the following two inequalities hold,
where κ > 0 and (θ(ξ
Note that, at each ξ ∈ D, agent h only choose short-positions ϕ(ξ) that maintain an amount of borrowing which is less than or equal to a fixed proportion κ > 0 of her initial wealth (alternatively, we can assume that borrowing constraints depend on the market value of aggregated wealth (see the next section for details)). We introduce this borrowing constraint in order to prevent agents from entering into Ponzi schemes.
Definition. An equilibrium for our economy is given by a vector of prices (p, q) jointly with
(b) At each ξ ∈ D, both physical and asset markets clear,
Existence of Equilibrium
In this section we formalize our main result which assures that equilibrium exists in our economy.
Theorem. Suppose that the following assumptions hold,
where
Then, our economy has an equilibrium.
The objective of Assumptions (A2) and (A4) is just to get bounds for equilibrium asset prices.
Precisely, we prove that, if intertemporal utility functions go to infinity as consumption increases (on commodities in which assets pay), assets prices are bounded away from zero. Moreover, when assets have positive net supply, Assumption (A4) will allow us to assure that assets prices have an upper bound as well (see example below).
Our financial constraints allow us to establish a link between the asymptotic amount of borrowing and the asymptotic value of initial endowments. Thus, to prove optimality of individual allocations, that will be obtained as limit of optimal allocations in finite horizon economies, it is enough to assure that the discounted value of individual wealth is finite (using as deflators the cluster point of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers corresponding to finite horizon economies). This will be the case, as it is proved in the Appendix (see the discussion after Lemma 2).
Note that, in the particular case in which assets are numerarie (that is, L(J) = {l}, for some l ∈ L), any utility function that is quasilinear in the commodity used as numerarie satisfy Assumption (A4).
then our economy has an equilibrium.
It is also important to remark that our Theorem does not hold if we assume that there exist some asset in zero net supply. We illustrate this point with the following example, adapted from Hernández and Santos (1996, Example 3.9, page 118). Assume that there is no uncertainty in the economy (i.e., D = {0, 1, 2, . . .}) and that there is only one commodity and only one consumer, which has a physical endowment w t = 1 at period (node) t ∈ D. Also, the preferences of the consumer are represented by the utility function U (x) = +∞ t=0 β t u(x t ), where u : R + → R + is a continuous, concave, strictly increasing and derivable function satisfying Assumption (A4). Moreover, for any t ≥ 0, β t is strictly positive and +∞ t=0 β t < +∞. Assume also that there is only one asset which is infinite-lived and is issued at t = 0. This asset promises a unitary real payment A t at period t > 0.
It follows that Assumptions (A1), (A3) and (A4) hold for this economy.
However, there is no equilibrium for the economy when +∞ t=0 β t A t = +∞. Note that this possibility may happen for a variety of discounted factors and asset payments (for instance, when
Essentially, if there is an equilibrium for the economy above, then first order conditions of the consumer's problem implies that, for any T ≥ 1, the unitary asset price at t = 0 satisfies,
Comments and remarks
In this Section, we present some comments and remarks which connect our existence results with related papers. We also analyze the assumptions that have been required to get existence of equilibrium in relation with other hypotheses stated in the literature.
Uniform impatience is not required to prove equilibrium existence. Equilibria with bounded utilities.
In our model, agents are not restricted to select bounded consumption plans. However, if we suppose that consumers can only choose plans
max (l,ξ)∈L×D y l (ξ) < ∞}, then Assumption (A4) can be removed when both aggregated endowments are bounded and (A3) is strengthened by requiring also separability on commodities. Precisely, we can adapt the proof of our theorem to obtain the following result.
Corollary 2. Suppose that consumption bundles are restricted to belong to l
, that Assumptions (A1)-(A3) hold, and that the following hypotheses are satisfied,
Then, there exists an equilibrium for our economy.
Alternative borrowing constraints.
Assume that for every (ξ, h) ∈ D × H we have ρW (ξ) ≤ w h (ξ), for some ρ ∈ (0, 1). Then, we can bound the growth of borrowing by requiring that, at each node ξ, q(ξ)ϕ(ξ) ≤ κp(ξ)W (ξ). Thus, borrowing constraints depend on the value of the aggregated wealth. Alternatively, the constraint
, can be implemented provided that initial endowments, as in Magill and Quinzzi (1996) , are uniformly bounded away from zero, i.e., ∃w ∈ R
Actually, maintaining Assumptions (A1)-(A4) of our Theorem, in any of the cases above the same technique of proof will operate: truncated economies will also have equilibrium, given that asset prices will be bounded away from zero and from above, node by node. The main point is that transversality condition will also hold (see equations (5)- (7) in the Appendix).
Bounds on net financial debt.
As a consequence of Assumption (A3) and (A4), for any ξ ∈ D, there exists an scalar a(ξ) > 0 such
Thus, given an equilibrium (p, q), (x h , θ h , ϕ h ); h ∈ H , for any agent h ∈ H, the net investment at a node ξ, which is given by max{q(ξ)(θ h (ξ)−ϕ h (ξ)); 0}, is lower than a(ξ) p(ξ) Σ . 1 In other case, instead of negotiating assets at ξ, the agent may use the resources to buy the bundle (a(ξ), . . . , a(ξ)) at this node, which gives more utility to them than those that she may receive if she consumes at any node departing from ξ the aggregated endowment of the economy.
Therefore, financial market feasibility implies that, for each h ∈ H, we have that
In particular, since we may assume, without loss of generality, that commodity prices satisfy p(ξ) Σ = 1, ∀ξ ∈ D, the net financial debt of any agent is bounded, node by node, independently of the equilibrium allocation.
Furthermore, there are some situations in which the sequence (a(ξ); ξ ∈ D) is also uniformly bounded and, therefore, individuals' net debt is uniformly bounded along the event-tree. For
, where β h ∈ (0, 1) represents an intertemporal discount factor, ρ h (ξ) is the probability of reach node ξ at period t(ξ) and satisfies, ρ h (ξ) = µ∈ξ + ρ h (µ) with ρ h (ξ 0 ) = 1. Moreover, suppose that Assumption (A5) holds. Then, it follows that, for any agent
, where W is an upper bound for the agregated endowments of the economy. Taking a number a such that min h∈H u h (a, . . . , a) > max h∈H
follows that a(ξ) ≤ a, ∀ξ ∈ D.
On non-binding debt constraints.
Note that, when there is at each node in the event-tree only one asset (finite or infinite-lived) available for trade, the uniform bound on net debt founded above induces an uniform bound on borrowing. Within this context, for values of κ large enough, our borrowing constraints are not binding at equilibrium. Previously, Hernández and Santos (1996) have shown equilibrium existence in an economy with debt constraints, when only one infinite-lived asset in positive net supply is traded. We assure more when agents are burden by borrowing constraints, namely, restrictions on the amount of borrowing became non-binding.
About the existence of rational bubbles.
Suppose that Assumptions (A1)-(A5) hold and that initial endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero.
, where β h and ρ h (ξ) satisfy the conditions previously stated, it follows from the previous comments that, for the equilibrium allocation we construct, (i) marginal rates of substitution will be summable (see equation (7) in the Appendix), and (ii) net debts will be uniformly bounded along the event-tree. In particular, as assets have positive net supply, their prices will be uniformly bounded along the event-tree. Therefore, the discounted value of asset prices, using the marginal rates of substitution as deflators, goes to zero as time goes to infinity. A necessary and sufficient condition for the absence of rational asset pricing bubbles. That
is, analogous to Magill and Quinzii (1996) and Santos and Woodford (1997) , the positive net supply assures that equilibrium asset prices are free of bubbles when uniform impatience holds. 
Conclusion
In this paper we give conditions which assure that, when finite or infinite-lived real assets in positive net supply are available for trade, equilibrium always exists in infinite horizon economies with incomplete financial markets. Borrowing constraints depending of the value of endowments (either individual or aggregated) avoid Ponzi schemes and assure equilibrium existence if utility functions are either unbounded and separable in states of nature or separable in commodities. With numerarie assets and utility functions that are quasilinear in the commodity used as numerarie, equilibrium also exists.
However, this results depend crucially on the positive net supply of assets. In fact, as we exemplify, in our model equilibrium does not necessarily exist when assets have zero net supply. This also happens in the models of Hernández and Santos (1996) and Magill and Quinzii (1996) . As we can infer from the proof of equilibrium existence and from the example of non-existence of equilibria, the main difficulty is to find endogenous lower and upper bounds on assets prices, in order to obtain equilibria for truncated economies (which lead to get an equilibrium allocation as a limit equilibria in the sequence of truncated economies). It is in the second of these steps-the determination of upper bounds on asset prices-that the positive net supply and the unboundedness of utility functions become crucial. As a matter of future research, it is interesting to find conditions to prove equilibrium existence even with zero net supply long-lived assets, since within this type of financial contracts rational asset pricing bubbles with real effects may appear (see Magill and Quinzii (1996, Proposition 6.3)).
3 Since utilities satisfies a strong version of Assumption (A3) and endowments are uniformly bounded form above and away from zero, uniform impatience holds, as was proved by Páscoa, Petrassi, and Torres-Martínez (2010,
Proposition 1).
To prove our main result we show, firstly, that there exists equilibrium in finite horizon truncated economies. Then, we find an equilibrium for the original economy as the limit of a sequence of equilibria corresponding to the truncated economies, when the time horizon increases.
Truncated economies. For each T ∈ N, we define a truncated economy, E T , in which agents consume commodities and trade assets in the restricted event-tree D T (ξ 0 ).
be the set of available securities at
Each individual h ∈ H is characterized by her physical, (w h (ξ); ξ ∈ D T (ξ 0 )), and financial,
her utility is given by
For each truncated economy E T , we can consider, without loss of generality, prices (p, q) in
. Then, given (p, q) ∈ P T , agent h ∈ H solves the following optimization problem:
Let B h,T (p, q) be the truncated budget set of agent h, i.e., the set of plans (y(ξ)) ξ∈D T (ξ0) that satisfy the restrictions of the problem P h,T above.
Definition 1. An equilibrium for the economy E T is given by prices (p T , q T ) ∈ P T and individual
, such that:
is an optimal solution for P h,T at prices (p T , q T ); T and define,
Let G T (X , Θ, Ψ, M ) be a generalized game where each consumer is represented by a player h ∈ H and, at each ξ ∈ D T (ξ 0 ), there is also a player who behaves as an auctioneer.
More precisely, in G T (X , Θ, Ψ, M ) each player h ∈ H behaves as price-taker and, given (p, q) ∈ P T M , she chooses strategies in the truncated budget set B h,T (p, q) ∩ K(X , Θ, Ψ) in order to maximize the function U h,T . Also, at each ξ ∈ D T −1 (ξ 0 ) (resp. ξ ∈ D T (ξ 0 )) the corresponding auctioneer chooses commodity and asset prices (p(ξ),
, where
a Nash equilibrium for G T (X , Θ, Ψ, M ) if each player maximizes her objective function, given the strategies chosen by the other players, i.e., no player has an incentive to deviate.
Under Assumptions (A1) and (A3) the set of Nash equilibria for the game G T (X , Θ, Ψ, M ) is non-empty.
Proof. Note that each player's strategy set is non-empty, convex and compact. Further, it follows from Assumption (A3) that the objective function of each player is continuous and quasi-concave in her own strategy. Assumption (A1) assures that the correspondences of admissible strategies are continuous, with non-empty, convex and compact values. Therefore, we can find an equilibrium of the generalized game by applying Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem to the correspondence defined as the product of the optimal strategy correspondences.
, then every Nash equilibrium of the game G T (X , Θ, Ψ, M ) is an equilibrium of the economy E T whenever X and M are large enough.
Then, as each auctioneer maximizes his objective function, we have that, at each ξ ∈ D T (ξ 0 ),
It follows from Assumptions (A3) and (A4) that, for each ξ ∈ D T (ξ 0 ), there exists a real number
from individual optimality that the value of accumulated individual financial endowments, at any
, then in any Nash equilibrium of G T (X , Θ, Ψ, M ) the upper bounds of asset prices, which were previously imposed, are non-binding. Along the rest of this proof we assume that this property holds.
Step 1. Physical markets clear.
Summing up the budget constraints at ξ 0 we have p
. By the construction of the plan M, we know that q T j (ξ 0 ) < M ξ0,j , which leads us to obtain a contradiction with the optimal behaviour of the auctioneer at ξ 0 . Thus ξ (y h,T (ξ), y h,T (ξ 0 ); p, q). Using the fact that Ω(ξ 0 ) ≤ 0, we can deduce that p T (ξ)Γ(ξ) + q T (ξ)Ω(ξ) ≤ 0, for every ξ with t(ξ) = 1.
using the borrowing constraints, we conclude that, for every player h ∈ H,
Thus, by monotonicity of preferences,
u h (µ, W (µ)), ∀T > N + 1.
Taking the limit as T goes to infinity we obtain,
Thus, it follows from inequality (6) that, 
ξ∈D γ h ξ p(ξ)w h (ξ) < +∞.
Therefore, it follows from Assumption (A3) that: For each ε > 0 there exists N ε > 0 such that,
Finally, we conclude that, for each ε > 0, U h (x) ≤ ε + U h (x), which ends the proof.
Proof of the Corollary 2. Given (ξ, h) ∈ D × H, definẽ satisfy Assumptions (A3) and (A4). Therefore, there exists an equilibrium (p(ξ), q(ξ)); (y h (ξ)) h∈H ξ∈D , being y h (ξ) = (x h (ξ), θ h (ξ), ϕ h (ξ)), for the economy in which each h ∈ H has preferences represented by the functionŨ h instead of U h . Moreover, this equilibrium is actually an equilibrium for the original economy. In fact, since agents are restricted to choose bounded consumption plans, if there exists a budget feasible allocation (x h , θ h , ϕ h ) such that U h (x h ) > U h (x h ) then there is λ ∈ (0, 1) such that, the consumption plan x(λ) := λx h + (1 − λ)x h , with x(λ) = (x l (λ, ξ); ξ ∈ D), satisfies x l (λ, ξ) < 2W l (ξ), ∀l ∈ L(J). Thus,
which is a contradiction. 4 We denote by ∂f h l (ξ, x) the super-gradient of a concave function f h l (ξ, ·) at point x. That is, z ∈ ∂f h l (ξ, x) iff f h l (ξ, y) − f h l (ξ, x) ≤ z(y − x) for every y ∈ R + . Recall that, given l ∈ L(J), ∂f h l (ξ, x) = ∅ at any point x > 0.
